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The E®ects of Mergers in Open Auction Markets
The e®ects of mergers have been examined in a number of papers using the traditional Nash-Cournot model with a homogeneous product, but allowing¯rms to have di®erent capacities. 1 Several recent papers have examined mergers in auction markets with¯rms having di®erent cost distributions. 2 In this paper, we investigate the e®ects of mergers in an asymmetric auction model of procurement. The buyer employs an open auction with a reserve price to purchase an input from suppliers having private information about their cost of producing the input. We characterize a family of cost distributions which has a natural interpretation for the size of the suppliers. Using this model, we examine the traditional merger questions. Does a merger increase the price and reduce the welfare of the buyer? Do the suppliers have an incentive to merge? Does a merger reduce total welfare? The answers to these questions in this model will have some similarities and some di®erences from those obtained using the Nash-Cournot model.
Antitrust enforcement agencies such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission and private plainti®s must frequently evaluate mergers in industrial product markets governed by an auction. The winner-take-all characteristic of auction models can lead to misinterpretations when used to analyze the competitive e®ects of a merger. One naive argument is that all the suppliers have an equal chance of winning each auction and thus the industry should be treated as a symmetric oligopoly for assessing concentration. Another naive argument is that each auction is a separate market and will inherently have only a single supplier. Both of these arguments distort the competitive conditions and are designed to limit the scope of enforcement. Auction markets also provide an opportunity for implausible defenses. For example, the merging suppliers may argue that they rarely 1 Perry and Porter (1985) consider the incentive to merge in a Nash-Cournot model with a homogeneous product. Shapiro (1990a and 1990b ) examine a general version of the capacity model used by Perry and Porter (1985) , and focus on the welfare e®ects of mergers. With the linear version of this capacity model, McAfee and Williams (1992) characterize the pro¯table mergers between two¯rms that would increase welfare. Werden (1991) also reexamines the linear model in order to illustrate the relevance of the Her¯ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in assessing the price e®ects of mergers. Deneckere and Davidson (1985) examine mergers in a market with di®erentiated products where multibrand¯rms are comparable to suppliers with a larger capacity.
2 Waehrer (1997) examines mergers in both asymmetric¯rst-price and second-price auction markets. Dalkir, Logan, and Masson (2000) and Tschantz, Crooke, and Froeb (2000) examine mergers in asym-metric¯rst-price auctions using simulated equilibrium bidding strategies. Thomas (1998) examines mergers in asymmetric¯rst-price auctions by deriving equilibrium bidding strategies for the binomial cost distribution. Brannman and Froeb (2000) and Froeb, Tschantz, and Crooke (1998) examine mergers in asymmetric second-price auctions with the extreme value cost distribution. There is also a related literature on collusion in auction markets. For example, see DeBrock and Smith (1983) , Graham and Marshall (1987) , Von Ungern-Sternberg (1988) , Mailath and Zemsky (1991) , McAfee and McMillan (1992) , and McAfee (1994) . More recently, Mares (2000a and 2000b) examines mergers in asymmetric common-value auctions.
compete directly with one another because some non-merging supplier typically makes the lowest or the second lowest bid in the auctions. One goal of this paper is to clarify the competitive e®ects of mergers in auction markets.
We examine mergers using an open auction model of procurement. In an open auction, the auction begins at some high price, declines with progressively lower bids, and the contract is awarded to the last bidder in the auction. 3 An open auction is also known as a descendingprice oral auction. If the costs of the suppliers are private information and stochastically independent, the dominant strategy of a supplier in an open auction is to continue bidding as long as the price is above his cost. When the costs are private and independent, an open auction is strategically equivalent to a second-price auction. In a second-price auction, the suppliers submit sealed bids to the buyer, and the buyer purchases the input from the lowest bidder at a price equal to the second lowest bid. The dominant strategy of a supplier in a sealed-bid second-price auction is to submit a bid equal to its cost. This dominant strategy makes open auctions and second-price auctions much more tractable than sealed-bid¯rstprice auctions when the suppliers are asymmetric with di®erent cost distributions. 4 This tractability is particularly important if the buyer is also setting a reserve price. However, the results of our analysis will provide some insights into mergers in¯rst-price auction markets. 5 Our model has some advantages for merger analysis relative to other models in the literature. First, we derive a convenient family of cost distributions from fundamental properties. This family has a parameter with a natural interpretation as the capacity of the suppliers and is directly related to the market share of suppliers in equilibrium. Second, we de¯ne a general measure of increased concentration in terms of the capacity pro¯les of the suppliers. This measure includes mergers as a trivial case. Third, we allow the buyer to employ a reserve price and set it optimally in response to di®erent capacity pro¯les. The optimal reserve price allows the buyer to moderate the price e®ects of increased concentration. Fourth, we obtain a general result that increased concentration reduces the welfare of the buyer, even after an optimal reduction in the reserve price. With this result, we can compare a variety of the possible mergers that might arise from a given capacity pro¯le. Fifth, we¯nd that the optimal reserve price can undermine the incentive for mergers from various concentrated 3 While we use the terms open auction and second-price auction to describe the institution used by the buyer, our results apply to any market institution where the lowest cost supplier sells the input.
4 General treatments of asymmetric¯rst-price auctions can be found in Maskin and Riley (2000) , Lebrun (1999), and Waehrer (1997) . 5 Tschantz, Crooke, and Froeb (2000) ¯nd that the competitive e®ects of mergers is similar in¯rst-price and second-price auctions. The open auction model might also be an appropriate representation of a market even though the buyers do not employ a strict descending-price oral auction. For example, buyers might invite an initial sealed bid from the suppliers, suggesting a¯rst-price auction. However, if the buyers subsequently use the low bids to \whipsaw" other suppliers into lowering their bids, an open auction model seems more appropriate.
3 capacity pro¯les. This¯nding contrasts sharply with the results from the Nash-Cournot models. Finally, we compare the incentive to merge in this model to the incentive in an optimal auction. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we de¯ne the auction and characterize the family of cost distributions. In Section 2, we solve for the expected market shares of the suppliers, the expected price paid by the buyer, and the expected pro¯t of the buyer. In Section 3, we de¯ne the measure of industry concentration. In Section 4, we provide the general result that increased concentration reduces the expected pro¯t of the buyer. In Section 5, we examine the incentive to merge and the e®ects of mergers on total welfare and the pro¯ts of non-merging suppliers. In Section 6, we discuss the incentive to merge in an optimal auction. Finally, Section 7 concludes with a sample simulation of the merger e®ects on the buyer.
The Model
We assume that a buyer requests bids from n suppliers who can provide an input necessary for production of a¯nal good. The buyer employs an open auction to select the winning supplier. More generally, the market would be composed of a series of such auctions by a number of buyers.
The buyer has a value c 0 for the input where c 0 is known to the buyer and to all of the suppliers. We interpret c 0 as the buyer's cost of producing the input internally or as the cost of obtaining the input from a source other than the n suppliers. Alternatively, when there are no sources for the input other than the n suppliers, c 0 should be interpreted as the net revenue from using the input. 6 The buyer would clearly reject a bid to supply the input at a price above c 0 . However, we will also consider cases in which the buyer can reject bids below c 0 by committing to a reserve price r < c 0 . 7 Note that if the buyer cannot commit to a reserve price less than c 0 , we will simply assume that r = c 0 . Let N = f1; : : : ; ng denote the set of suppliers bidding in the auction. We assume that the ith supplier has a capacity parameter t i and draws his cost c i of producing the input from the distribution G(¢jt i ) with a support of [c; ¹ c] common to all suppliers. Denote the pro¯le of capacities for the suppliers as t = (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) and de¯net = P n i=1 t i as the total industry capacity. We assume that the costs of the suppliers are independently distributed. 8 6 Thus, c0 is the opportunity cost of not purchasing the input from one of the n suppliers. The buyer either incurs c0 in internal costs or sacri¯ces c0 in net revenues. 7 We assume that the buyer uses a single reserve price that applies equally to all of the suppliers. When the suppliers have di®erent cost distributions, the buyer may be able to gain by setting di®erent reserve prices for the di®erent suppliers. In Section 6, we consider an optimal auction which allows for di®erent reserve prices for di®erent suppliers.
8 This independence assumption would be violated if the costs of suppliers depended on the uncertain future prices of raw materials and if each supplier received a correlated signal about those future prices. Our Furthermore, each supplier obtains his cost of production prior to submitting a bid to the buyer and need not incur this cost unless he wins the auction to supply the input. Finally we assume that the buyer's value c 0 is greater than c.
In order to examine the e®ects of mergers and concentration, we need to de¯ne the size, scale, or capacity of the suppliers in terms of their di®ering cost distributions. As a benchmark case, we assume three properties on the cost distributions. First, we assume that there are no externalities across the cost distributions of di®erent suppliers. Second, we assume that capacity is homogeneous. Third, we assume that there are no economies or diseconomies of scale. These three properties can be formally expressed as follows:
Property 1 (No Externalities): The cost distribution of each supplier depends only on its own capacity and is independent of the capacities of other suppliers.
Property 2 (Homogeneity): If two suppliers have the same capacity, then they also have the same cost distribution.
Property 3 (Constant Returns):
The probability distribution of the lowest cost draw of the suppliers depends only on total industry capacity. In particular, it does not depend on the number of suppliers or how total industry capacity is distributed among the suppliers. That is, for any two capacity pro¯les t = (t 1 ; : : : t n ) and s = (s 1 ; : : : s m ) such thatt =ŝ and for any c 2 [c; c],
For a merger of two suppliers with capacities t i and t j , the capacity of the merged supplier is t m = t i + t j . Thus, constant returns implies that the cost distribution of this merged supplier is the distribution of the minimum of the two cost draws from the original suppliers. 9 That is, G(cjt i + t j ) = 1 ¡ [1 ¡ G(cjt i )] [1 ¡ G(cjt j )] : 10 The following result characterizes Properties 1, 2, and 3 in terms of the functional form of the cost distribution. 
model assumes that no such correlation exists. Thus, if raw material prices are relevant, we assume that these costs are known and common to the bids of all suppliers. Any remaining uncertainty about the costs of each supplier would depend only on characteristics unique to that supplier.
9 The quadratic cost model in Perry and Porter (1985) possesses this property of constant returns. De¯ne x(c; s) as the quantity of output that can be produced at or below a marginal cost of c, given the capacity s. The quadratic cost function implies that x(c; si + sj) = x(c; si) + x(c; sj): 10 Brannman and Froeb (1997) , Waehrer (1997) , Dalkir, Logan, and Masson (2000) , and Froeb, Tschantz, and Crooke (1998) also model mergers in this way. This type of merger is equivalent to e±cient collusion as discussed by Mailath and Zemsky (1991) and McAfee and McMillan (1992) .
The proof of Theorem 1 is in the Appendix. For the remainder of our analysis, we assume Properties 1, 2, and 3 are satis¯ed and thus, make use of the family of cost distributions provided by Theorem 1. 11 It is possible to interpret the capacity parameter t i as the number of draws from a cost distribution F , where the supplier uses the lowest draw for its cost of producing the input. As such, G(¢jt i ) is the distribution function of the order statistic for the lowest cost of t i independent draws from F . 12 Similarly, the capacity parameter t i can be interpreted as the number of plants from which the supplier could produce the input, each plant having a cost distribution F . This is the sense in which the parameter t i measures the size, scale, or capacity of a supplier. Thus, we will refer to t i as the capacity of the ith supplier.
Market Equilibrium and Expected Price
In the equilibrium of the open auction market that we consider, the lowest cost supplier wins at a price equal to the lower of the reserve price and the second lowest cost. When setting the reserve price, the buyer knows the capacities of the suppliers but does not know their actual cost realizations. For any given auction, there would be at most one winning supplier. Hence, in order to assess the industry performance, we examine the expected market share. The expected market share of a supplier is its probability of winning a given auction conditional on some supplier winning the auction.
De¯ne the random variable z as the lowest cost of the n suppliers, z = minfc 1 ; : : : ; c n g. By Property 3, the probability distribution of z is Prfz 6 cg = G(cjt). We can now state the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose the capacity pro¯le is t. (a) The ex ante expected market share of the i th supplier is the ratio of its capacity and the total industry capacity, t i =t. (b) The ex ante expected pro¯t of the i th supplier is
The proof of Lemma 1 is in the Appendix. The expected market share of each supplier is equivalent to its capacity share and independent of the reserve price. Holding the reserve price constant, a supplier's expected pro¯t depends only on its capacity t i and the industry capacityt. Expected pro¯t does not depend on how the capacityt ¡ t i is distributed among the other suppliers. Thus, a merger does not alter the expected pro¯ts of the non-merging suppliers or potential entrants when the buyer's reserve price remains unchanged. 13 For r 2 (c; c), a supplier's expected pro¯t is clearly increasing in the reserve price. A higher reserve price does not alter a supplier's market share, but it does increase the probability of purchase by the buyer.
It is straightforward to see that in equilibrium the expected lowest cost of producing the input conditional on purchase from a supplier can be written as
If the reserve price is¯xed, then the expected lowest cost depends only on total industry capacityt and not on the pro¯le t. The expected price conditional on purchase by the buyer is
The expected price is equal to the expected lowest cost plus the total expected pro¯ts of the suppliers, both conditional on purchase. This expected price is the market price that would be observed and does not include the cost of internal production when the reserve price is not met. The expected pro¯t of the buyer, U (rjt), is the net revenue R from using the input minus the buyer's expected cost EC(rjt). 14 The buyer's expectd cost EC(rjt) is the internal cost c 0 when the reserve price is not met plus the expected price when the reserve price is met.
If the reserve price is¯xed, then the capacity pro¯le enters p(rjt) and hence U (rjt) only through its e®ect on the sum of the expected pro¯ts of the suppliers. Thus, the e®ect of a merger on the expected price and the expected pro¯t of the buyer will follow directly from its e®ect on the total expected pro¯ts of the suppliers. On the other hand, if the buyer can optimally set the reserve price, then it will also depend on the capacity pro¯le. As a result, the e®ects of a merger on the expected price and expected pro¯t of the buyer are more complicated. Section 4 will examine the e®ect of market concentration and mergers on the buyer. That analysis is based on the de¯nition of industry concentration in the next section.
Definitions of Market Concentration
In this section, we de¯ne a concentration ordering which allows us to compare industry performance for di®erent capacity pro¯les. This ordering facilitates our examination of the welfare e®ects of mergers and the incentive for mergers. 15 Consider two capacity pro¯les t and s. The pro¯les t and s are equivalent if s is simply a rearrangement of the elements of t. For parts of the analysis, it is useful to order the capacities in a pro¯le by size. Thus, we de¯ne the index notation t (i) such that t (1) > ¢ ¢ ¢ > t (n) . When the suppliers f1; : : : ; ng follow their equilibrium strategies, the pro¯les (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) and (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ; 0) will result in the same outcomes. Hence, it is always possible to add suppliers with zero capacity to a market without a®ecting the equilibrium outcome. An equalizing transfer between two suppliers is a transfer of capacity from one supplier to another such that the absolute di®erence in capacities between the two suppliers is reduced. Let t be the pre-transfer capacity pro¯le and s be the post-transfer capacity pro¯le. More formally, an equalizing transfer of capacity from t to s for¯rms j; k 2 N requires that (i) j t j ¡ t k j > js j ¡ s k j, (ii) t j + t k = s j + s k , and (iii) t i = s i , for all i 2 N nfj; kg. In applying this de¯nition, it is important to note that any pro¯le can be arbitrarily reindexed without changing its properties.
Definition 1. Capacity pro¯le t is more concentrated than s by the transfer principle (t Â T s) if and only if s can be constructed from t by applying a¯nite series of equalizing transfers. 16
By the transfer principle, no pro¯le is less concentrated than one where all suppliers have the same capacity. It will be useful to employ the following equivalent de¯nition.
Definition 2. Capacity pro¯le t is more concentrated than s by second-order dominance (t Â SD s) if and only if for all m = 1; : : : ; n, P n i=m t (i) 6 P n i=m s (i) with the inequality strict for at least one m. 17 15 Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980) discuss the application of concentration measures to entry and mergers. 16 The Pigou-Dalton condition holds that inequality should increase when income is transferred from a poorer individual to a richer individual. While stated di®erently, the Pigou-Dalton transfer condition implies a concentration ordering that is equivalent to the transfer principle.
17 Shorrocks and Foster (1987) and Foster and Sen (1997) describe a number of concentration or inequality concepts such as generalized Lorenz dominance that are equivalent to second-order dominance (also referred to as second-order stochastic dominance).
In words, t is more concentrated than s by second-order dominance if for all m = 1; : : : ; n, the sum of the capacities of the (n¡m)th smallest suppliers from t is not greater for than the sum of the capacities of the (n ¡ m)th smallest suppliers from s. 18 Second-order dominance is useful for comparing pro¯les because it may be di±cult to identify the equalizing transfers or to prove that no such transfers exist. Finally, we de¯ne the Her¯ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission use in the Merger Guidelines. 19 Definition 3. Capacity pro¯le t is more concentrated than s by the Her¯ndahl-
A merger clearly results in a more concentrated industry under all three de¯nitions. The following proposition summarizes the relationship between these three de¯nitions.
Proposition 1. For capacity pro¯les t and s such thatt =ŝ,
These results are known from the literatures on mergers and income inequality. 20 Neither the transfer principle nor second-order dominance can compare every pair of capacity pro¯les even when the total industry capacity is¯xed. However, we show in the next section that when two pro¯les can be ordered, that ordering unambiguously predicts the comparison between the buyer's expected pro¯t and the optimal reserve price for the two pro¯les. Unlike the transfer principle, HHI generates a complete ordering of capacity pro¯les. Hence, there are cases where t Â H s but not t Â T s. 21 However, we will illustrate in the next section that the HHI can generate inconsistant predictions regarding the buyer's expected pro¯t.
The Effects of Concentration and Mergers on the Buyer
In this section, we examine the e®ect of industry concentration on the expected price and the expected pro¯t of the buyer. The following lemma states that the total expected pro¯ts of the suppliers is higher for capacity pro¯les that are more concentrated by the transfer principle. This lemma makes the proof for many of the subsequent results follow quite easily. 18 Since it is easier to identify the large¯rms in an industry, it is common practice to calculate and compare the shares of the largest suppliers. Second-order dominance is equivalent to this alternative approach when the pro¯les being compared have the same total capacity. 19 See U.S. Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, April 2, 1992 (Revised: April 8, 1997).
20 For example, see Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980) and Shorrocks and Foster (1987) . Lemma 2. If t Â T s, then for any r > c,
The proof of Lemma 2 is in the Appendix. The result follows from the fact that the expected pro¯t of each supplier is concave in its own capacity. The next theorem provides the key results on the e®ects of increased concentration.
Theorem 2. Suppose t Â T s. Then for any r > c, (a) U (rjt) < U (rjs) and (b) p(rjt) > p(rjs). Further suppose that r ¤ t and r ¤ s are the reserve prices that maximize the expected pro¯ts of the buyer, U (rjt) and U (rjs).
Proof. (a) For any given r > c, we have
The inequality follows from Lemma 2. (b) Similarly, making use of (3), for any given r > c, we have
(c) When the reserve price is adjusted to maximize the expected pro¯t of the buyer, U (r ¤ s js) > U (r ¤ t js) > U (r ¤ t jt). The¯rst inequality follows from the fact that r ¤ s is the pro¯t-maximizing reserve price when the buyer is faced with capacity pro¯le s. The second inequality follows from part (a) of the theorem.
(d) Note that,
¤ @r 6 0:
Therefore, 0 = @U(r ¤ t jt)=@r 6 @U (r ¤ t js)=@r. It follows that r ¤ t 6 r ¤ s . Q.E.D. Theorem 2 con¯rms that increases in concentration result in a lower expected pro¯t to the buyer. 22 In response, the buyer may react by lowering the reserve price, but this will only moderate the decline in his expected pro¯t. An immediate implication of part (a) of Theorem 2 is that for a given number of suppliers, a given total industry capacity, and a given reserve price, the expected price paid by the buyer is minimized when all of the suppliers have the same capacity. 23 22 Mares (2000b) proves a result corresponding to Theorem 2(a) for an interesting class of common value auctions (his Theorem 3). The model does not allow a reserve price, but the result is made di±cult by the fact that larger suppliers bid more aggressively in common value auctions. With their superior information about the common value, larger suppliers reduce the winner's curse correction on their bid. See Mares (2000b) for a general discussion of the e®ect of bidding rings on the equilibrium bids.
23 This result is also true in the Nash-Cournot model. See Farrell and Shapiro (1990a) and Werden (1991) .
In the remainder of this section, we examine various merger scenarios and consider their impact on concentration, the expected price, the expected pro¯t of the buyer, and the optimal reserve price.
Proposition 2. A merger of two or more suppliers results in a more concentrated market by the transfer principle. Thus, when the reserve price is¯xed, a merger results in a lower expected pro¯t to the buyer and a higher expected price. When the reserve price is set optimally in order to maximize the expected pro¯t of the buyer, a merger results in a lower expected pro¯t to the buyer and a lower reserve price. 24
Proof. Suppose that suppliers j and k merge. For an initial pro¯le s, the resulting capacity pro¯le can be de¯ned as t j = s j + s k , t k = 0, and t i = s i , for all i 2 Nnfj; kg. Clearly t Â T s because reversing the merger is an equalizing transfer. The proof is completed by applying Theorem 2.
Q.E.D. With a¯xed reserve price, the buyer will receive a lower expected pro¯t because of the higher expected price of the input even though there is no change in the probability of purchase. The higher expected price arises because the price becomes the third highest cost when the two subsidiaries of the merged supplier have the two lowest costs among all the suppliers. By adjusting the reserve price optimally, the buyer may be able to reduce the adverse price e®ects of the merger, but the envelope theorem still implies that the merger reduces the expected pro¯t of the buyer. 25 The expected price p(rjt) paid to suppliers may not increase (see Example 1 below), but the buyer's expected cost EC(rjt) of producing or purchasing the input increases with the merger.
When the buyer can set the reserve price optimally, the buyer possesses some bargaining power as a monopsonist. The optimal reserve price is analogous to a monopsonist choosing the optimal quantity to purchase along an upward sloping supply curve. The internal cost of production of the buyer a®ects the optimal reserve price. If c 0 is su±ciently greater than c, the buyer will¯nd the reserve price too costly to employ. In this situation, a merger will increase the expected price paid by the buyer. However, when c 0 is lower and the optimal reserve price is below c, the e®ect of a merger on the expected price paid by the buyer is ambiguous. The direct e®ect of higher concentration increases the expected price, but the indirect e®ect through the reserve price reduces the expected price. The following examples illustrate that the expected price can rise or fall with a merger to monopoly.
Example 1. Suppose that s = ( 1 2 ; 1 2 ) and F is the uniform distribution over the unit interval. Now consider the merger of suppliers 1 and 2. Thus, t = (1; 0). When c 0 = 1; the optimal reserve prices are r ¤ s = 5=9 and r ¤ t = 1=2, and the expected prices are p(r ¤ s js) = 47=90 and p(r ¤ t jt) = 1=2. Thus, the expected price falls after the merger.
Example 2. Consider the same assumptions as in Example 1 except that c 0 = 1:8. The optimal reserve prices are r ¤ s = 1 and r ¤ t = 9=10. The expected prices are p(r ¤ s js) = 5=6 and p(r ¤ t jt) = 9=10. Thus, expected price rises to the reserve price after a merger to monopoly.
The fact that the expected price can fall after the merger should not be interpreted as a decrease in the buyer's expected cost of the input. Proposition 2 implies that the buyer's expected cost of producing or purchasing the input increases even though the buyer optimally lowers the reserve price. Thus, in auction markets with a reserve price, one cannot simply examine the market price in order to assess the welfare e®ects of mergers on buyers. 26 We can also use Theorem 2 and the transfer principle to compare a variety of mergers between di®ering suppliers in the industry.
Proposition 3. For any initial capacity pro¯le t, if t j > t k and t g > t h , then a merger between suppliers j and g results in a more concentrated industry by the transfer principle than a merger between suppliers k and h:
The proof of Proposition 3 is in the Appendix. Proposition 3 validates the natural intuition that the acquisition of a larger supplier will result in a more concentrated industry than the acquisition of a smaller supplier. Consider four suppliers from a capacity pro¯le t such that t 1 > t 2 > t 3 > t 4 . Proposition 3 clearly implies that a merger of suppliers 1 and 2 results in a more concentrated market than a merger between suppliers 3 and 4, and that a merger of suppliers 1 and 3 results in a more concentrated market than a merger between suppliers 2 and 4. With the additional condition that t 2 + t 3 > t 1 + t 4 , second-order dominance implies that a merger of suppliers 2 and 3 results in a more concentrated market than a merger of suppliers 1 and 4. 27 However, if t 1 + t 4 > t 2 + t 3 , then neither merger results in a market that is more concentrated than the other. Even though the merger of suppliers 1 and 4 creates a larger supplier than the merger of suppliers 2 and 3, it need not result in a lower expected pro¯t for the buyer. 28
The Incentive to Merge and Total Welfare
The incentive to merge and the welfare e®ects of a merger depend on how the reserve price is a®ected. When the reserve price is¯xed, we¯nd that total welfare is unchanged and there is always an incentive to merge. However, when the buyer sets the reserve price optimally, total welfare declines as a result of a merger and there may be no incentive to merge. 29 Total welfare depends directly on the industry capacity and the reserve price but not on the distribution of industry capacity. Total welfare W (rjt) can be written as
The¯rst term (R ¡ c 0 ) is the pro¯t from internal production, and the second term is the expected cost savings from production of the input by the least cost supplier. Consider a merger between suppliers 1 and 2. Let s and t denote the pre-merger and post-merger capacity pro¯les. Hence, t 1 = s 1 + s 2 ; t 2 = 0, and t i = s i , for all i = 2 f1; 2g. Assuming a¯xed reserve price, suppliers 1 and 2 have an incentive to merge if ¦ 1 (rjt) > ¦ 1 (rjs) + ¦ 2 (rjs).
Proposition 4. If the reserve price is una®ected by a merger, then total welfare and the pro¯ts of the non-merging suppliers are una®ected by the merger, and there is always an incentive to merge.
Proof. The fact that total welfare and the expected pro¯ts of the non-merging suppliers are una®ected by a merger is clear from the expressions for W (rjt) and ¦ i (rjt).
For the pro¯les s and t de¯ned above, the incentive to merge can be expressed as
The equality follows from the fact that ¦ 2 (rjt) = 0 and ¦ i (rjt) = ¦ i (rjs), for all i = 2 f1; 2g.
The inequality follows from Lemma 2 since t is more concentrated than s. Q.E.D.
lower expected pro¯ts for the buyer. It is straightforward to construct examples where the HHI indicates higher concentration but the buyer's expected pro¯t increases. Suppose that t = (0:77; :018; 0:05) and
With a¯xed reserve price the welfare e®ects of a merger are straightforward. The probability of purchase remains unchanged, and a merger merely reallocates pro¯ts from the buyer to the merged supplier. 30 There is always an incentive to merge because the merged supplier receives a higher expected price in cases where the two merging suppliers would have had the two lowest costs. The non-merging suppliers are una®ected by the merger because they receive the same expected price when they have the lowest cost.
If the buyer can optimally set the reserve price, the e®ects of the merger are more interesting. In particular, total welfare will indirectly depend on the distribution of industry capacity across suppliers through its e®ect on the reserve price.
Proposition 5. If the buyer sets the reserve price optimally given the capacity pro¯le and there is a positive probability that the reserve price is not met, then mergers reduce total welfare and the pro¯ts of the non-merging suppliers.
Proof. Note that for r 2 (c; c), W (rjt) and ¦ i (rjt) are strictly increasing in r. From the proof of Lemma 2, it is clear that when the optimal reserve price is less than c, an increase in concentration will lead to a strict decrease in the optimal reserve price.
Q.E.D. From Theorem 2, the buyer lowers the reserve price after the merger in order to moderate the price e®ects of the more concentrated industry. Total welfare declines because the lower reserve price reduces the probability of purchase. Even though the market share of a nonmerging supplier remains unchanged, his expected pro¯ts decline because the lower reserve price reduces the probability of purchase and may reduce the price received when he wins the auction. 31 When the reserve price is set optimally, the expected pro¯ts of the merged supplier may or may not be greater after the merger. The merged supplier would receive a higher expected price for any¯xed reserve price, but the lower reserve price reduces the expected pro¯ts of the merged supplier in the same manner as it does for the non-merging suppliers. If the suppliers know that the buyer will optimally reset the reserve price in response to their merger, then they would presumably take this into account in calculating the expected 30 With a¯xed reserve price, there is no deadweight loss from a higher expected price. This is a consequence of de¯ning the auction for a single input. Alternatively, if the buyer was purchasing multiple inputs and employed a unit price auction, higher prices would generate a deadweight loss for the buyer. See Spulber (1995) . Such a model would be too cumbersome with asymmetric suppliers and an optimal reserve price. Moreover, the optimal reserve price in this model has a similar e®ect in that it reduces the probability of purchase and generates a reduction in welfare because of the higher probability of internal production. 31 This result is di®erent from the Nash-Cournot model. In that model, non-merging suppliers obtain higher pro¯ts by expanding production in response to the higher market price after the merger. This insight has been used in Antitrust cases to argue that non-merging suppliers cannot successfully challenge a merger because they would have no damages. This auction model provides an explanation of why non-merging suppliers would be harmed by a merger.
pro¯ts after a merger. Thus, the negative e®ects of the lower reserve price can undermine the incentive to merge. Consider the following two examples.
Example 3. Suppose that s = (1; 1 2 ; 1 2 ) and F is the uniform distribution over the unit interval. Now consider the merger of suppliers 2 and 3. Thus, t = (1; 1; 0) . When c 0 = 1, the optimal reserve prices are r ¤ s = 2 25 (9 ¡ p 6) and r ¤ t = 1=2. The expected pro¯ts of the merging suppliers, pre-and post-merger, are ¦ 2 (r ¤ s js) + ¦ 3 (r ¤ s js) t 0:08019 and ¦ 2 (r ¤ t jt) = 1=12 t 0:08333. Thus, suppliers 2 and 3 have an incentive to merge.
Example 4. Consider the same assumptions as in Example 3, except suppose that s = (1; 1). Now consider the merger of suppliers 1 and 2. Thus, t = (2; 0). The optimal reserve prices are r ¤ s = 1=2 and r ¤ t = 1 ¡ 1= p 3, and the expected pro¯ts of the merging suppliers are ¦ 1 (r ¤ s js) + ¦ 2 (r ¤ s js) t 0:1666 and ¦ 1 (r ¤ t jt) t 0:1535. Thus, suppliers 1 and 2 have no incentive to merge.
These two examples provide some intuition about the incentive to merge. In Example 4, the negative e®ects of the lower reserve price fall completely on the merged supplier since it is the only supplier in the market after the merger. On the other hand, in Example 3, the negative e®ect of the lower reserve price is shared between the merged supplier and the non-merging supplier.
The surprising result of Example 4 is that merger to monopoly is not pro¯table for a symmetric duopoly. 32 The buyer's optimal reserve price facing a monopoly completely undermines the incentive of the duopolists to merge. This suggests that the optimal reserve price of the buyer can undermine a merger wave. The buyer's ability to commit to a reserve price can allow him to maintain a \stable" industry structure in which there would be no incentive for pairwise mergers that would further concentrate the industry. The triopoly pro¯le in Example 3 is not stable, but the duopoly pro¯le in Example 4 is stable. Table 1 reports the stable pro¯les that would arise from various initial symmetric pro¯les. Starting from each initial pro¯le, we exhaust all possible pro¯table mergers to arrive at the stable pro¯les. 33 For Table 1 , we assume that F is uniform over the unit interval, that 32 Using a models that are mathematically similar, Thomas (1998) and McAfee (1994) also¯nd that in some cases there is no incentive for merger to monopoly. These results from the auction models are clearly at variance with the symmetric or asymmetric Nash-Cournot models. The symmetric model of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) ¯nds an incentive for symmetric duopolists to merge even though there is no incentive for oligopolists to merge. In Perry and Porter (1985) , larger¯rms are more likely to have an incentive to merge, and asymmetric duopolists would always have an incentive to merge. All the gains from a merger to monopoly by duopolists in these models would be internalized. 33 An e®ective but ine±cient program written in Mathematica checks all possible merger paths reporting the resulting stable pro¯le when all pro¯table mergers have been exhausted along a particular path. Our program is available upon request. Other pro¯les may be stable. However, they could not be reached by pro¯table mergers from the initial symmetric pro¯le. 
the buyer's cost of internal production is c 0 = 1, and that the buyer sets the reserve price optimally for each pro¯le. In the¯rst part of Table 1 , the initial symmetric pro¯les have the same industry capacity oft = 1. Thus, the expected industry cost (E [z] = 1=2, fort = 1) remains constant for all the initial pro¯les. Several interesting¯ndings arise. First, small suppliers have an incentive to merge, but large suppliers may not. Second, di®erent stable pro¯les can arise from the same initial pro¯le as a result of a di®erent sequence of pro¯table mergers. Third, the reduction in the optimal reserve price is not su±cient to create stable pro¯les having more than three suppliers. Fourth, the optimal reserve price eliminates the incentive for a large supplier to merge once its capacity is near half of the industry capacity.
One important determinant of stable pro¯les is the industry capacity which determines the expected industry cost E [z]. The second part of Table 1 reports the stable pro¯les that arise from initial pro¯les with six symmetric suppliers, but di®erent total industry capacities. Whent = 6 and the initial pro¯le is (1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1), the industry will merge to monopoly. With a large industry capacity, the expected industry cost E [z] is well below the buyer's internal cost c 0 (E [z] = 1=7, fort = 6). As a result, the reserve price is costly for the buyer to employ and becomes less e®ective at eliminating the incentive to merge. However, when industry capacity is smaller, the reserve price prevents merger to monopoly. As in the¯rst part of Table 1 , duopoly and triopoly pro¯les are stable.
A second important determinant for this analysis of stable pro¯les is the buyer's internal cost of production c 0 . When the internal cost of production c 0 is less than or equal to highest possible cost c for the suppliers, it is always pro¯table (ex ante) to set a reserve price r < c 0 6 c. In such cases, mergers reduce the reserve price and create the possibility of stable pro¯les. However, if c 0 > c, then the optimal reserve price for some or all pro¯les need not be less than c. The reserve price is more costly to employ and is less likely to prevent mergers to monopoly.
Example 5. Consider the same assumptions as in Example 4 except suppose that c 0 = 2: The optimal reserve prices are r ¤ s = 1 and r ¤ t = 2=3, and the expected pro¯ts of the merging suppliers are ¦ 1 (r ¤ s js) + ¦ 2 (r ¤ s js) = 1=3 and ¦ 1 (r ¤ t jt) = 28=81 > 1=3. Thus, unlike Example 4, suppliers 1 and 2 have an incentive to merge.
Examples 4 and 5 illustrate that a higher internal cost of production reduces the ability of the buyer to undermine the incentive for duopolists to merge to monopoly.
The results of this section on the incentive to merge provide a clear contrast with the traditional Nash-Cournot model. In this auction model, the incentive to merge is undermined by the optimal reduction in the reserve price. As a result, larger suppliers with greater capacities are less likely to have an incentive to merge because they would bear most of the burden of the reduction in the reserve price. On the other hand, smaller suppliers would typically have an incentive to merge. Thus, concentrated stable industry structures can arise from mergers. In contrast, no such stability exists in the Nash-Cournot model. The incentive to merge is undermined because the non-merging suppliers expand production in response to the higher price or reduction in output by the merged supplier. Thus, larger suppliers are more likely to have an incentive to merge, and smaller suppliers are less likely. If any merger is pro¯table, then further mergers to monopoly will also be pro¯table. 34
Optimal Auctions
Thus far we have assumed an open auction where the lowest cost supplier is selected to the supply the input given that the reserve price is met. Moreover, we have assumed that the buyer selects a single reserve price that applies all of the suppliers. Myerson (1981) shows that when the suppliers are symmetric and the reserve price is selected to maximize the pro¯ts of the buyer, the open auction is optimal in that there is no other purchasing mechanism that will increase the pro¯ts of the buyer. However, the open auction is not optimal when the suppliers are asymmetric. An optimal auction would favor suppliers with lower capacities. In particular, a supplier with a lower capacity might be selected to supply the input even when a supplier with higher capacity has a lower cost. The optimal auction may involve di®erent reserve prices for the di®erent suppliers: a lower reserve price for higher capacity suppliers and a higher reserve price for lower capacity suppliers. Optimal auctions are more di±cult to design and implement and thus less useful for policy analysis. However, we will brie°y describe the implications of optimal auctions for the incentive to merge.
In an optimal auction, smaller suppliers with a given cost have a higher probability of winning than in an open auction with an optimal reserve price. Hence, smaller suppliers have an advantage in an optimal auction that is not present in an open auction. Smaller suppliers will then¯nd it less pro¯table to merge because they would relinquish the advantage from being small. Similarly, a merger of large suppliers will increase the disadvantage of the merged supplier and thus reduce the incentive to merge. Hence, we generally expect a reduced incentive to merge in an optimal auction. The following example illustrates this intuition.
Example 6. Suppose that s = (1; 1 2 ; 1 2 ), c 0 = 1, and F is the uniform distribution over the unit interval. Now consider the merger of suppliers 2 and 3. Thus, the post-merger pro¯le is t = (1; 1; 0). Assuming that the buyer uses an optimal auction, the expected pro¯ts of the merging suppliers, pre-and post-merger, are ¦ 2 o (r ¤ s js) + ¦ 3 o (r ¤ s js) t 0:08985 and ¦ 2 o (r ¤ t jt) = 1=12 t 0:08333. 35 Thus, suppliers 2 and 3 have no incentive to merge in an optimal auction.
With the same assumptions as in Example 6, Example 3 illustrates that there is an incentive for suppliers 2 and 3 to merge in an open auction. The intuition regarding the reduced incentive to merge in an optimal auction is only valid for pro¯les with three or more suppliers.
Conclusions for Antitrust Policy
We have examined the qualitative e®ect of mergers or other increases in market concentration. However, in practice it is often desirable to obtain quantitative estimates of the e®ects of a merger. As with other market models, the e®ects of a merger can be simulated. 
Merger simulation of auction models requires a calibration of the cost distributions for the suppliers. Theorem 1 provides a justi¯cation for using a convenient functional form for G.
Since the expected market share is t i =t from Lemma 1, the capacity of the ith supplier could be estimated from the observed market share, given the industry capacityt. The remaining problem is calibrating the other dimensions of G, in particular, the range of costs [c; c], the distribution F , the industry capacityt. Several authors have suggested methods for calibrating distributions for auction models. 36 Economies of scale could also be incorporated into the simulations by de¯ning G(cjt i ) = 1 ¡ [1 ¡ F (c)] Á(t i ) where Á is a strictly convex function. Finally, if the buyer sets an optimal reserve price below c, then simulation would require an estimate for c 0 . Table 2 illustrates how a simulation could quantify the e®ects of a merger on a buyer. For the sample simulation, we assume that F is uniform on the unit interval and that t = 1. We then examine the e®ects of pro¯table mergers beginning from an initial pro¯le of (1=4; 1=4; 1=4; 1=4). In order to illustrate the importance of the internal cost of production and the reserve price, Table 2 reports the e®ects of each merger for two di®erent values of c 0 (1 and 3/4), with and without an optimal reserve price. The e®ect of the merger can be measured by the percentage increase in the buyer's expected cost.
As demonstrated by Theorem 2, the optimal reserve price declines with each merger, and the buyer's expected cost increases. Table 2 illustrates that the percentage increase in the buyer's expected cost is much smaller with the optimal reserve price than without. This moderating e®ect arises both from the use of the reserve price and from the reduction in the reserve price after the merger. Thus, the reserve price provides signi¯cant protection for the buyer when his internal cost of production is near or within the range of costs for the suppliers.
When the buyer's internal cost of production is lower, the optimal reserve price is also lower, and the buyer's expected cost is lower. If the internal cost of production is less than the upper bound on the costs of the suppliers, then the buyer becomes a competitor in the provision of the input. This also provides an additional element of protection for the buyer. In sum, the buyer's internal cost of production and the optimal reserve price are important moderating factors on the adverse competitive e®ects of a merger.
Proof of Lemma 1. (a) The probability that all of the ith supplier's rivals have costs higher than c i is Q j6 =i [1 ¡ F (c i )] t j = [1 ¡ F (c i )]t ¡t i . Since each supplier submits a bid equal to its cost and the lowest cost supplier wins, the ith supplier's ex ante probability of winning the auction is equal to the probability that all of the other suppliers have a higher cost and its cost is below the reserve price. The ith supplier's ex ante probability of winning is equal to
Hence, the ith supplier's ex ante probability of winning, conditional on some supplier win-
denote the ith supplier's expected pro¯t in equilibrium when he has costs c i , the reserve price is r, and the capacity pro¯le is t.
(using integration by parts).
The indicator function, 1 fc i 6rg , is equal to one when the condition within the braces is true and zero otherwise. The ith supplier's ex ante expected pro¯t is ¦ i (rjt) = E[¼ i (c i ; rjt)] where the expectation is taken over his cost.
o dc i (using integration by parts). (7) Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove the lemma for arbitrary t and s such that t Â T s, it is su±cient to prove the lemma for t and s that di®er by a single equalizing transfer. Hence, de¯ne t and s such that for some j; k 2 N , t j > s j > s k > t k , t j + t k = s j + s k , and t i = s i , for all i 2 N nfj; kg. Let ® = t j ¡ s j . De¯ne the function e ¦ as e ¦(r;
o dc: It is straightforward to verify that e ¦ is strictly convex in its second argument. Thus, The¯rst and second equalities follow after substituting, canceling, and rearranging terms. The inequality follows from the strict convexity of e ¦ since t j > s k . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. We¯rst show that for any j; k; g 2 N such that t j > t k , a merger between suppliers j and g results in a more concentrated market than a merger between suppliers k and g. Let s 1 denote the capacity pro¯le after the merger of j and g, and let s 2 denote the capacity pro¯le after the merger of k and g. Speci¯cally, s 1 g = s 2 g = 0, s 1 j = t g + t j , s 2 k = t g + t k , s 1 k = t k , s 2 j = t j , and for all i 2 N nfj; kg, s 1 i = s 2 i = t i . Note that P n i=1 s 1 i = P n i=1 s 2 i . Therefore, s 1 Â T s 2 if js 1 j ¡ s 1 k j > js 2 j ¡ s 2 k j. This inequality is equivalent to jt g + t j ¡ t k j > jt g + t k ¡ t j j which follows from t j > t k .
For any j; k; g; h 2 N , such that t j > t k and t g > t h , consider the capacity pro¯les that result from the mergers of suppliers j and g and suppliers k and h. For the case where t g = t h , the proof is complete. Now suppose t g > t h . With an initial pro¯le t, let s 3 denote the capacity pro¯le after the merger of¯rms k and h. Note that s 2 Â T s 3 follows from the result established in the¯rst part of the proof. Therefore, by transitivity s 1 Â T s 3 . Q.E.D.
